PSP-002: Security Threat Analysis for Foundation Governance and Publication
Status: Draft (Radar / Not Active)
Author: Dustin M. Gelegonya, Claude (AI)
Created: December 2025
Priority: Medium
Authority: PSP v1
1. Identifier & Title
PSP-002: Security Threat Analysis for Foundation Governance and Publication
2. Problem Statement
The JellyLabs foundation governs decisions, development, and publication. These processes could be vulnerable to:
- Authority hijacking
- Accidental or malicious canonization
- Content injection into specs/docs
- Governance bypass
- Trust erosion through ambiguity
It is unclear whether a formal security threat analysis is warranted, and if so, what its scope should be.
3. Proposed Change
This proposal does not assume a security analysis is required.
It exists to decide:
- Whether a formal security threat analysis should exist
- What problem it would solve
- What its scope and threat model should be
- What artifact form it should take (doc, appendix, or spec)
4. Rationale
The foundation already addresses many risks through:
- Patterns & Risk Prioritization (Tier 1 threats identified)
- Human Authority Fallback
- Accepted Failure Modes
- PSP proposal gates
A dedicated security analysis may be redundant, necessary, or premature. This proposal forces an explicit decision.
5. Scope Boundaries (Critical)
“Security” in this system refers to:
- Authority hijacking
- Accidental or malicious canonization
- Content injection into specs/docs
- Governance bypass
- Trust erosion through ambiguity
”Security” does NOT refer to:
- Network security
- Model jailbreaks
- Prompt injection in deployed systems
- Traditional AppSec / InfoSec domains
- Infrastructure or operational IT security
Those are real problems — just not this system’s problem.
6. Alternatives Considered
Alternative A: Do nothing
Rationale: Existing patterns and risk documentation may be sufficient.
Alternative B: Create a full security threat model
Rationale: May provide value but risks scope creep and security theater.
Alternative C: Defer until a specific threat emerges
Rationale: Pragmatic but potentially reactive.
7. Impact Analysis
If analysis is warranted:
- New artifact created (placement TBD)
- FTL-012 (Safety) may need updates
- Cross-links to Patterns & Risks
If analysis is not warranted:
- Documented rationale preserves the decision
- No new artifacts
- Scope boundary becomes reference material
8. Risks and Mitigations
| Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Scope creep into generic security | Explicit scope boundaries (section 5) |
| Security theater | Decision criteria: does it prevent a named threat? |
| Analysis never completed | FTL-013 forces explicit decision |
9. Decision Status
- Status: Draft (Radar)
- Decision Authority: Protocol Steward (Dustin M. Gelegonya)
- Decision Date: Pending evaluation via FTL-013